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SCHEME TO DEFRAUD; VIOLATION OF MAIL REGULATIONS;
PLAUSIBILITY; TREASURE FINDING. United States v. Fay (Dis-
trict Court, E. D. Mo.), 83 Fed. 839. The accused had written
to one Howard, claiming to possess preternatural powers, and had
obtained $5o from Howard on the positive assurance that, with
mental vision, he would penetrate into the bowels of the earth and
locate certain treasure supposed to be hidden under Howard's
farm. He was charged with violating Section 5480, U. S. Revised
Statutes, which provides that, "If any person having devised, or in-
tending to devise, any scheme or artifice to defraud, or be effected
by either opening, or intending to open, correspondence or com-
munication with any other person by means of the postoffice estab-
lishment, . . . shall, in and for executing such scheme or artifice,
or attempting to do so, place any letter or packet in any postoffice
of the United States . . . he shall upon conviction, etc."
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NOTES.
Section 5480 involves three matters of fact: (i) That those
charged devised a scheme to defraud ; (2) that the postoffice es-
tablishment was to be a medium in effecting the scheme; (3) that,
in carrying out the scheme, the person charged either deposited a
letter or packet in the postoffice or received one therefrom: Stokes
v. U. S., 157 U. S. 187 (1894); U. S. v. Smith, 45 Fed. 56x
(i8gi), and cases there cited. These three constituents of the
offense were present in Fay v. U. S., yet District Judge Adams
sustained a motion to quash the indictment on the ground that the
scheme to defraud must be in the nature of a plausible device-one
in itself reasonably adapted to deceive persons of ordinary com-
prehension and prudence.
This is leaving out of account the subjective guilt of the ac-
cused, and allowing the judge to discharge him if his pretence be
of a monstrous character. It would seem that this is not only ob-
scuring the statute, but giving immunity as well to the most brazen
swindlers like Fay-men of whose stripe have certainly succeeded
for ages in imposing upon the credulous by means of just such
statements as Fay made. Where the promise exceeds the bounds
of reason, there is little logic in saying that forthwith the element
of fraud is lost. See U. S. v. Reed, 42 Fed. 134 (1889), in which
case an even more preposterous assumption of second sight was
held to be within the scope of the statute. See, also, U. S. v.
StaPles, 45 Fed. 193 (i89i), and Circuit Justice Brewer's opinion
in Weeber v. U. S., 62 Fed. 740 (1894), that it is immaterial
whether the man sought to be defrauded-or any other man-wo';ld
be really affected by the scheme, which in that case, as in U. S. v.
_Ray, was transparent.
Judge Adams said of Fay's plan: "A manifest hoax and hum-
bug, like a proposition to take a person on a flying trip to the
moon, to fit out a traveler for a submarine voyage to China, or any
which belies the known and generally recognized laws of nature,
cannot deceive any rational being." Without dwelling on our ad-
vances in science, which make yesterday's marvel a commonplace
of to-day, it is enough to remark that, in our present state of
progress, the absolute range of physical possibility is a poor test
and a shifting one, likely to be misapplied even on the bench.
For at least submarine navigation is not wholly impossible; it is
not repugnant to the principles of physics; and were Edison or
Tesla to advertise such an invention, he would be believed by
thousands of shrewd, sensible people.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; RELEASE P,7 CLIENNT; SUI1,,EQUI.NT
CONDUCT OF ATTORNEY; DISBARMENT. In re Boone (U. S. Cir-
cuit Court, N. D. of California). 83 Fed. 944. Respondent, an
attorney, had assisted a client in obtaining a decree establishing
the validity of certain patents. After the termination of his em-
ployment, he wrote to the attorney of an adversary of his client in
another suit involving the same patents, falsely stating that he
NOTES.
loS& essed information that the said decree was obtained by fraud
and could be reversed. This statement was made with the purpose
of casting discredit on the decree, and with the end in view of
obtaining employment against his former client, and, if successful,
of using the knowledge he had confidentially acquired against him.
Held, by Morrow, J., that this conduct was sufficient ground for
disbarment.
In the Mirror of justices, Chap. 2, Sec. 5, it is said, "A pleader
is suspendable when he is attainted to have received fees of-two
adversaries in one cause." The case before us shows that the
disability of an attorney to render professional services against a
client is not confined to the same suit. Cases may arise, and the
present one is an instructive example, where, though the pro-
fessional relation no longer exists, the attorney would still be
equally false to the obligations of secrecy and fidelity in rendering
professional services against a former client.
United States v. Costen, 38 Fed. 24 (1889), was a case very
similar. An attorney was counsel for complainant in certain
litigation. After acting as such for some time, he ceased to be
thus employed, and subsequently offered his services to the other
side and advised its counsel that he was in possession of facts of
great importance to that side; but that he desired the fact of his
employment concealed. Mr. Justice Brewer, upon this showing,
granted the application for disbarment. In the present case there
was a formal release from all the "duties, burdens, obligations and
privileges pertaining to the relation," and permission to the at-
torney to engage his services "pro or con as he may see fit." But
such an agreement, if it could possibly be construed as respondent
wishes, would be totally void and inoperative as contrary to public
policy. An attorney has never been permitted to divulge any
matter communicated to him in professional confidence: Benjamin
v. Coventry, i9 Wendell (N. Y.), 353 (1838); Bank of Utica v.
,erseraf, 3 Barbour Ch. Rep. 528 (1848). And facts commu-
nicated have been held confidential, even though the counsel
declined to be engaged for the client: Bank of Ll/ica v. .Aferserau
(supra). So, likewise, where the employment has terminated, the
obligation to refrain from divulging confidential communication
still remains.
The general principles governing these cases are well settled.
Any conduct on the part of an attorney showing his unfitness for
the confidence and trust which attend the relation of attorney and
client, or indicating such a lack of personal honesty, or of good
moral character, as to render him unworthy of public confidence,
constitute a ground for his disbarment: 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. of
Law (2d Ed), p. 302, and cases there cited. By admitting an
attorney, the court presents him to the public as worthy of its
confidence, and it is the duty of the court, after full and satisfac-
tory proof of his delinquency, to withdraw its endorsement:
-Davies' Case, 93 ra. ii6 (188o).
NOTES.
Two recent cases of disbarment have attracted considerable atten-
tion in Philadelphia. In one case, before Judge Arnold, the
practice of hunting up and purchasing law suits was exposed: 55
Leg. Int. i99 (1898). In the other case an attorney, while acting as
counsel for certain parties, borrowed money from his clients on the
security of a forged mortgage: 55 Leg. Int. 208 (1898), Judge Biddle.
Fortunately such cases as these do not often appear in the reports.
AcTION FOR PERSONAL INJURIES; COMPULSORY EXAMINATION OF
PLAINTIFF. In O'Brien v. City of La Crosse, 75 N. W. (Wis.) 81
(May 3, 1898), an action was brought for a personal injury sus-
tained by reason of a plank in an alleged defective sidewalk sud-
denly flying up and striking the plaintiff, causing permanent in-
juries. The defendant moved for an order that the plaintiff, who
had already been examined by defendant's physicians, be com-
pelled to submit to further examination, even against the advice of
plaintiff's physician. This request was denied, and the defendant
excepted. It was held that there was no error in the refusal, the
right to examine in the absence of statute resting entirely in the
discretion of the court.
There can be no doubt of the accuracy of the principle laid
down. The case is exactly parallel with that of -Hess v. Lowrey,
122 Ind. 225 (1889). There the defendant had failed: to make a
motion for the physical examination of the plaintiff until after the
close of the plaintiff's evidence. The court said that while it was
undoubtedly true that the court may, in its discretion, require the
plaintiff to submit his person to a reasonable examination by com-
petent physicians and surgeons, when necessary to ascertain the
nature, extent and permanency of injuries, yet under the circum-
stances there was no error in refusing the order.
In St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Dobbins, 30 S. W. 887, (1895),
the Supreme Court of Arkansas said that it was entirely within the
discretion of the lower court to direct whether such an examination
should or should not be made. See also Railroad Co. v. C/ildress,
82 Ga. 719 (1889); Railroad Co. v. Brunker, 128 Ind. 542
(189o), Railroad Co. v. lill, 90 Ala. 71 (1889).
In a case of interest to Pennsylvania lawyers, Petit v. Brewer,
8 W. N. C. 253 (i88o), the Court of Common Pleas denied the
defendant's right entirely to compel the plaintiff to submit to a
physical examination. The defendant had ordered of the plaintiff
a set of false teeth for his wife. Plaintiff had made them and de-
livered them to defendant, who retained them, but refused to pay
for them. The plaintiff contended that it was essential to his case
to prove that the teeth fitted the mouth of the person for whom
they were made. He therefore moved for an order of court to
compel the wife's appearance. In refusing the motion the court
said that such an order would be a tyrannical exercise of power,
wholly without authority of law and contrary to the Bill of Rights
of Pennsylvania.
